The design of subnational administrative units is fundamental to the functioning of states and their political topography. Yet, we lack theoretical and empirical knowledge on the determinants of the partitioning of state territories into subnational governance units. I argue that aligning administrative borders with ethnic geography facilitates local institutional persistence and increases short term governance efficiency. Yet, because such *packing* of units stabilizes peripheral institutions and identities, some governments may instead design heterogeneous units and *crack* groups and their institutions to centralize power. I analyze these arguments by studying unit-design in Sub-Sahara Africa, contrasting indirect with direct forms of colonial rule using new data on administrative and early-colonial ethnic geographies derived from historical maps. Modeling administrative borders with a probabilistic spatial partition model, I find evidence that administrative borders are strongly and positively associated with ethnic boundaries. These effects are more pronounced under indirect British compared to more direct French rule and driven by their packing of uncracked groups into administrative units. With novel theory, data, and methods, this paper contributes to our understanding of the varying ethno-geographic roots of administrative geographies in Africa.
Abstract
The design of subnational administrative units is fundamental to the functioning of states and their political topography. Yet, we lack theoretical and empirical knowledge on the determinants of the partitioning of state territories into subnational governance units. I argue that aligning administrative borders with ethnic geography facilitates local institutional persistence and increases short term governance efficiency. Yet, because such packing of units stabilizes peripheral institutions and identities, some governments may instead design heterogeneous units and crack groups and their institutions to centralize power. I analyze these arguments by studying unit-design in Sub-Sahara Africa, contrasting indirect with direct forms of colonial rule using new data on administrative and early-colonial ethnic geographies derived from historical maps. Modeling administrative borders with a probabilistic spatial partition model, I find evidence that administrative borders are strongly and positively associated with ethnic boundaries. These effects are more pronounced under indirect British compared to more direct French rule and driven by their packing of uncracked groups into administrative units. With novel theory, data, and methods, this paper contributes to our understanding of the varying ethno-geographic roots of administrative geographies in Africa.