Fate or Choice?

Attitudes Toward Collaboration and Reintegration in Ukraine

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Abstract

War-affected populations are often divided along social identities as well as individuals difficult choices of fighting for either side or keeping one's head down. Focusing on Ukraine, we study the question of whether Ukrainians now primarily relate to each other based on fated traits like ethnic descent or their choices to resist/collaborate with Russia. We articulate alternative psychological and moral theories about whether a war of national survival should harden ethnic divisions or create pressure to accept individuals based on their choices. Relying on interviews and survey experiments, we find that Ukraine's citizens prefer neighbors who resist Russia's aggression in line with the moral theory. However, ethnic descent is a psychological barrier to integration as citizens prefer a passive Ukrainian over a Russian who resisted. Our findings reveal challenges to social cohesion in Ukraine.

Keywords: Collaboration, resistance, reintegration, Ukraine, ethnicity, national identity

"Collaborators are everywhere" — a Ukrainian soldier from Lviv[1]

Introduction

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament hastily criminalized many types of contact with the enemy under a wide definition of "collaboration."[2] To date, the prosecutor has investigated more than 8,100 collaboration allegations (Walker 2024). They include high-profile cases like Viktor Medvedchuk, a Putin ally accused of financing pro-Russian propaganda (BBC 2022), as well as individuals who directly assisted the Russian military, such as the man who helped guide a missile toward a crowded café in Kramatorsk, killing 13 civilians (Guardian 2024). But they also include the owner of a garbage collection company who opened a bank account in rubles while Kherson was under Russian occupation (Speri 2023), a farmer who provided medical treatment to wounded Russian soldiers (Rasulova 2023), and a teacher who was forced to adopt the new curriculum of the Russian occupiers (Kramer and Varenikova 2022).

In Ukraine and in territorial conflicts generally, civilians face difficult choices between supporting the war effort, collaborating with the enemy, or trying to stay neutral. How these decisions are evaluated by conflict-affected populations has important implications for social cohesion during the war and, after the war, for reintegration. How do conflict-affected populations draw the line between survival and collaboration? Can collaborators be reintegrated?

Informed by twenty qualitative interviews with Ukrainians[3] and prior literature, we articulate a psychological theory of inter-group bias which predicts that Ukrainians' judgments of each other are influenced by un-chosen "fated" traits

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[1]Male, aged 30-40 years, Lviv oblast, March 2024.

[2]Note that "collaboration" has no definition under international law, which does not prohibit collaboration (Darcy 2019). Only acts of collaboration that amount to spying or direct participation in hostilities affect the protected status of civilians under international law. While the United Nations have condemned the ill-treatment of alleged collaborators in different contexts, these condemnations do not imply a definition or threshold for what types of contact with the enemy count as collaboration under international law.

[3]See Appendix for more information about the interviews and research ethics.

based on ascriptive identities, namely ethnic descent and involuntary exposure to occupation. A moral theory, in turn, predicts that Ukrainians judge each other depending on their conduct and volition, namely the choice to collaborate with or resist Russia's aggression. Once we understand how Ukrainians judge each other's choices, the question arises whether someone branded a "collaborator" can be reintegrated. The answer may again depend on fated traits or on their choices, particularly the significance of their collaboration and contrition. We test these theories using two original conjoint experiments embedded in a representative survey of 2,513 Ukrainian citizens in territories not controlled by Russia at the time of fielding the survey in April 2024.

Understanding how conflict-affected populations draw the line between survival and collaboration and whether collaborators can be reintegrated is particularly urgent in Ukraine, where Ukrainians must make decisions to resist, collaborate or "keep their heads down" in the context of historical ethnic divisions, shifts in territorial control between Ukrainian and Russian forces, and the internal displacement of more than 3.7 million Ukrainians since 2022 (IOM 2024). For years following Ukraine's independence, the country was cast as divided into two ethnic groups: Western-oriented ethnic Ukrainians and a more ethno-culturally and linguistically Russified population in the East (Riabchuk 1992). Following this logic of "two Ukraines" (Riabchuk 2002), we would expect that ethnic bias, specifically against citizens of ethnic Russian descent, shapes citizens' perceptions of collaboration and prospects for reintegration. However, in recent years, scholars have increasingly argued that Ukraine now has a "civic national identity," understood as "an identity that places civic duty and attachment to the state above all other lines along which the nation could be defined" (Onuch and Hale 2022, 280). In this view, individuals can choose whether they are Ukrainian through their behavior (Wilson 2024). This would imply that choices override fated traits.

The literature on post-conflict reconciliation provides limited answers to whether fate or choice determines attitudes toward collaboration and reintegration.

Although observational studies have found that conflict-affected populations often fail to differentiate in their harsh judgment of collaborators (Darcy 2019; von Lingen and Cribb 2017), more recent survey experiments suggest that punishment preferences vary depending on the characteristics of the collaborators, including the importance and voluntariness of their collaboration (Kao and Revkin 2023; Godefroidt and Langer 2023). Whether inter-group biases (e.g., ethnic, religious, tribal) shape attitudes toward collaboration and reintegration is subject to conflicting evidence. Whereas Revkin, Alrababah and Myrick (2024) report no effect of ethnic identities on preferences for transitional justice in Donbas and Iraq, other studies find that inter-group biases matter in Colombia, Afghanistan, and among ethnically and religiously diverse populations in Iraq (Agneman and Strömbom 2023; Butt 2024; Kao, Fabbe and Petersen 2023). The evidence on whether transitional justice can increase the likelihood of successful reintegration of former collaborators is complicated by the wide range of processes subsumed under this label (Vinjamuri and Snyder 2015), disagreement about the goals of transitional justice (Teitel 2005; OHCR 2023), and variation in cultural contexts (Abe 2013; Byrne 2004).[4]

In this paper, we therefore articulate alternative moral and psychological theories about whether war generally, and a war of national survival in particular, closes the ranks around "fated" traits such as ethnic descent or heightens the moral relevance of individuals' choices. Experiment I tests to what extent Ukrainian citizens judge each other by their fated traits and choices. Fated traits are operationalized as the ethnic descent of a person and the stigma of having lived under occupation[5] Individuals' choices are modeled as their conduct on a spectrum from fighting with Russia (most active collaboration) to fighting with Ukraine (most active resistance). We use respondents' stated willingness to accept an individual as a neighbor—given variation in ethnic descent, occupation stigma, and conduct—as a measure for social cohesion and an individual's prospects for reintegration in society.

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[4]Kao, Fabbe and Petersen (2023)'s study in Iraq suggests that transitional justice mechanisms may not increase the likelihood of redemption of collaborators.

[5]We explain below to what extent and why surviving occupation, or "occupation stigma" as we call it, is a "fated trait."

We find that respondents' willingness to accept hypothetical conjoint profiles as neighbors is primarily driven by individuals' choices. Yet, fated traits create significant barriers to reintegration. In support of our moral theory, differences in conduct are the strongest predictor of a potential neighbor's acceptance. More significant acts of resistance have the largest positive effect,, and any form of collaboration steeply decreases acceptance of a hypothetical neighbor. Voluntariness amplifies the effects of collaboration and resistance. However, in support of psychological theories of inter-group bias, respondents—in particular ethnic Ukrainians but not Russians—are significantly biased against ethnic Russian individuals and, to a lesser extent, against survivors of Russian occupation. Profiles of ethnic Russians are 28 percentage points less likely to be preferred by respondents, while the stigma of exposure to Russian occupation decreases acceptance by 12 percentage points.

Although these "fated" traits create a barrier to reintegration, they do not make Ukrainians judge conduct more harshly. In fact, we find the opposite: Even though ethnic Russians are seen as less desirable neighbors overall, collaboration has a larger negative effect when the collaborator is of Ukrainian descent, suggesting that ethnic Ukrainians have higher expectations of members of their in-group compared to out-group members. Similarly, resistance is valued more and collaboration is more easily forgiven when these actions were taken under Russian occupation compared to actions taken in areas controlled by the Ukrainian government. Moral and psychological factors hence interact to determine how people relate to each other in the face of aggression.

As an extension of the main study, Experiment II asks how fate and choice interact with two potential redemptive mechanisms—public apologies and criminal punishments—to shape collaborators' prospects for reintegration. Acceptance after collaboration is again primarily determined by the significance of an individual's collaboration though bias against individual's of Russian descent persists. A public apology has a positive effect on respondents' willingness to accept former collab-

orators as neighbors, an effect that does not differ by ethnic descent. However, criminal punishment has no effect, suggesting that respondents do not believe that prosecution and incarceration are effective means of rehabilitation. This result is consistent with previous studies suggesting that restorative and victim-centered justice mechanisms, including apologies and community service, may be more effective than criminal punishment for promoting the reintegration of former offenders into society (Guenther 2013; Revkin and Kao 2024).

Our findings contribute to the literature on social cohesion in conflict-affected populations. We show that even in a war of national survival, individuals relate to each other based on a judgment that echoes moral principles: the significance of conduct modified by its voluntariness. Embracing members of an ethnic outgroup as full citizens in exchange for their loyalty and defense of the nation also makes instrumental sense in a war that threatens the survival of the group. And still, while choices matter, they cannot fully overcome the psychological barrier to reintegration that fated traits create. An ethnic Ukrainian who kept their head down is preferred as a neighbor to an individual of Russian descent who resisted the aggression by fighting with Ukraine. This reveals the persistent relevance of ethnic identity in Ukrainian society and suggests that there are limits to Ukrainian "civic nationalism" in the face of Russian aggression. A threat to the survival of the state is a unifying force that heightens the moral relevance of individuals' choices. Even that force has limits though in the face of the psychological pull of ethnic bias.

Collaboration and Resistance in Ukraine

Shortly after Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine's parliament amended the country's penal code to criminalize a wide range of interactions defined as "collaboration" with the enemy.[6] Punishable offenses include "public denial of the existence of armed aggression" and refusal to recognize Ukraine's "sovereignty over the tem-

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[6]Law No. 2108-IX `https://perma.cc/B838-G29B` and Law No. 2107-IX, `https://perma.cc/Z3FX-VHKL`.

porarily occupied territories." The amendments also create an affirmative duty of resistance: Citizens living under occupation risk collaboration charges if they do not resist demands to disseminate "the aggressor state's propaganda in educational institutions", demands to engage in "any economic activities in cooperation with the aggressor state," or to "hold a position related to the performance of organizational, administrative, or economic functions." These types of collaboration can be punished with up to three, five, and ten years imprisonment, respectively. Harsher prison sentences of 15 to 20 years apply to those who collaborate with Russian judicial or law enforcement agencies or participate or assist in Russian military operations.[7]

Our interviewees were uniformly and acutely aware that collaborators live among them in both occupied and government-controlled territories. Even beyond the wide range of actions that are criminalized as "collaboration" lie choices that Ukrainians judge harshly. Our interviewees highlighted betraying Ukrainian culture and taking economic advantage of the invasion as objectionable. One woman described the pain she felt when seeing a close friend who had previously taken pride in wearing a *vyshyvanka* (a traditional Ukrainian shirt), teaching the Ukrainian language to children and singing Ukrainian songs, quickly begin to collaborate with the occupying Russians.[8] Other interviewees were dismayed to see Ukrainians, including former friends and neighbors, join Russian soldiers in looting businesses and homes after the invasion.[9]

Research on previous conflicts has found that individuals are often branded "collaborators" merely for surviving occupation (Ibáñez and Moya 2016; Kao and Revkin 2023; McClintock 2019). Interviews provide evidence for this "occupation stigma" in Ukraine. Ukrainians who have lived under occupation are often met

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[7]All citation from Library of Congress, "Ukraine: New Laws Criminalize Collaboration with an Aggressor State," (April 4, 2022), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2022-04-04/ukraine-new-laws-criminalize-collaboration-with-an-aggressor-state.

[8]Female, aged 40-50 years, Kyiv city, August 2023.

[9]Female, aged 30-40 years, Lviv oblast, July 2023 and female, aged 50-60 years, Zakarpattia oblast, August 2023.

with suspicion when they flee to Ukrainian-controlled areas. Ukrainians from eastern regions closest to Russia who moved west to escape occupation reported feeling stigmatized by their new neighbors (Speri 2023) many of whom have relatives who were conscripted to defend the eastern front (Tarkhanova 2023). A woman from Mariupol complained in an interview that children at her son's new school called him "a separatist."[10] Many participants in government-controlled regions articulated suspicions of new arrivals from Russian-occupied areas. One woman asked, "How was it possible to let them [the Russian army] in through the Crimean Isthmus?"[11]

Reports of neighbors turning on each other (Verini 2023) and interviewees stressing that "every person who collaborated, every politician, every prosecutor, every citizen should be punished"[12] raise important questions about how Ukrainians who made divergent choices in the face of Russia's aggression perceive each other while the conflict is still ongoing. Whether they will be able to live together after the war ends is equally unclear but critical for social cohesion and transitional justice in Ukraine. Some prior studies of how conflict-affected populations treat collaborators have suggested that they differentiate based on the severity and voluntariness of collaboration, but these studies have focused on civil wars in South Africa (Gibson 2006; Wilson 2001), Ireland (Tam et al. 2008), and Colombia (Agneman and Strömbom 2023), or on U.S.-led interventions in Iraq (Kao and Revkin 2023) and Afghanistan (Butt 2024; Nadery 2007).

Facing a threat to its survival as a nation and partial occupation by a hostile neighbor, Ukraine is an extreme case. Populations that were occupied by Axis powers during World War II provide the closest comparison case. The Soviet Union killed over 100,000 (Hastings 2015) and France about 9,000 alleged Nazi collaborators (Novick 1968, 203).[13] Istevan Deak writes that formerly occupied populations "hoped to rid themselves of the memory of their compromises and crimes

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[10]Female, aged 50-60 years, Zakarpattia oblast, August 2023.
[11]Female, aged 50-60 years, Chernihiv oblast, January 2023.
[12]Female, aged 40-50 years, Rivne oblast, March 2024.
[13]Women branded "horizontal collaborators" were publicly degraded (Kershaw 2015, 474).

by decimating their own ranks" (Deák 2018, 3). Indeed, the historical record suggests that "total war implies that civilians have extended national duties" (Röling 1960, 437), creating high baseline expectations of resistance. Ukrainians have also demonstrated a strong preference against Russian territorial or political control since February 2022 (Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon 2023). This makes Ukraine a hard case for the theory that war-affected populations differentiate based on the significance and voluntariness of collaboration and accept reintegration of collaborators.

National Identity in Ukraine

But do Ukrainians even primarily relate to each other based on their choices? Interviews provide significant evidence for anti-Russian bias, with interviewees frequently relaying feelings of "disgust" about Russia, the country and its people: "I'd say there are no good Russians, at this point that entire nation does nothing but disgust me."[14] Others suggested that all things Russian evoke disgust: "Anything that's Russian now seems negative and repulsive to me."[15] One woman shared that even her children hold such views: "My daughter now says 'do not even say Russian'.... she now has a kind of disgust (отвращение) at Russians; even to the language."[16] And some interlocutors included ethnic Russians living in Ukraine in their feelings of revulsion: "Russians in general – let's unite them as a negative, that is, Russians as a nation, as an ethnic group. If they did not remain silent, if they had a backbone, it would mean a lot."[17] Participants often expressed a desire to differentiate themselves from Russians, asserting that they "are not people, they are not a race – they are ... torturers and murderers. They are from the planet of executioners."[18]

These statements seem to vindicate studies that have long portrayed post-

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[14]Female, aged 18-30 years, Kyiv city, January 2023.
[15]Female, aged 18-30 years, Kyiv city, January 2023.
[16]Female, aged 50-60 years, Kyiv city, January 2023.
[17]Female, aged 50-60 years, Kyiv city, January 2023.
[18]Female, age undisclosed, Kharkiv oblast, January 2023.

1991 Ukraine as a nation "divided by cultural, linguistic, religious or regional differences" (Kubicek 2000, 274). The "one state, two countries" (Riabchuk 2002) featured "a high concentration of ethnic Russians" (Giuliano 2018) who largely spoke Russian and shared a pro-Russian "political orientation and voting proclivities" (Birch 2000; Lowell 1997) in the country's eastern *oblasti* (regions) (Arel and Khmelko 1996; Bremmer 1994) and an "ethnic Ukrainian west" where people predominantly favored political integration with Europe (Birch 2000; Hesli, Reisinger and Miller 1998).[19] Indeed, some of our participants suggested that Ukrainians relate to each other based on membership in these groups (Barrington 2002), with high levels of bias against ethnic Russians in particular after Russia's 2022 invasion.

However, since the 2013-14 Euromaidan (Onuch and Hale 2022) and Russia's annexation of Crimea (Wilson 2024), scholars have increasingly challenged the view of Ukrainian society as divided into clear-cut, immutable ethnic groups. Instead, the increasingly dominant position in the literature is that a "civic" national identity has emerged (Onuch, Hale and Sasse 2018; Sasse and Lackner 2018, 2019). Attachment to the modern Ukrainian nation no longer depends on inherited characteristics, like ethnic descent, but on fulfilling civic duties (Riabchuk 2015).[20] President Volodymyr Zelensky has been particularly influential in promoting the idea of a civic Ukrainian identity that transcends ethnic and linguistic differences (Onuch and Hale 2022). He devised policies to promote civic identities through "patriotic education" in national symbols and the Ukrainian language.[21] His plans to enable foreign volunteer fighters to obtain Ukrainian citizenship (RFE 2024) further signal that "being Ukrainian" is a choice rather than fate (Kulyk 2023).

Supporting this idea that individual choices matter more than ascriptive identities, interviewees regularly stressed that "there are no problems with nationality,

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[19]The ethnic and political division closely mapped onto a geographical "split between Eastern and Western Ukraine" (Holdar 1995) along the Dnipro River.

[20]Language spoken publicly can also be a signifier for a person's chosen identity (Kulyk 2024; Wilson 2024).

[21]Daria Zubkova, "Stefanchuk Signs Law Introducing Military-Patriotic Education In Schools," *Ukrainian News* (Dec. 19, 2022), `https://ukranews.com/en/news/902986-stefanchuk-signs-law-introducing-military-patriotic-education-in-schools`.

different nationalities, or national minorities" in Ukraine because it is individuals' "actions, what they do for Ukraine" that "make them Ukrainian."[22] Some Ukrainian citizens "went to the army, some help and volunteer, some just work on a factory," but they are all Ukrainian because "they realised that Ukraine is their state [and they] stood up to protect it."[23] To underscore how a person's actions determine who is "a true Ukrainian," several participants detailed that people from many different ethnic groups[24] and even citizens of other countries[25] are fighting with Ukraine's Armed Forces. Interview participants stressed that identification with the Ukrainian nation means "a certain moral obligation towards ... the citizens of Ukraine," we should "forever forget about ... identifying nationality based on blood."[26]

In conclusion, qualitative interview data provides evidence for both, a strong affective rejection of the Russian ethnic out-group among Ukrainian citizens in the face of Russia's aggression, but also the perceived heightened relevance of Ukrainian citizens' choices given the threat to the nation. Although survey work since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 supports Ukrainians' sense of civic duty (Barrington 2021; Sasse and Lackner 2019), the *relative* importance of ethnic bias compared to the choice to resist or collaborate in how Ukrainians relate to each other has not been studied since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion. The relative importance of fate and choice and how ascriptive and chosen identities interact in how Ukrainians relate to each other significantly shape social cohesion and prospects of transitional justice in Ukraine and war-affected societies more generally.

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[22]Male, aged 30-40 years, Lviv oblast, January 2024 and male, aged 40-50 years, Lviv oblast, March 2024.

[23]Male, aged 40-50 years, Zakarpattia oblast, January 2024.

[24]Male, aged 30-40 years, Chernivtsi oblast, January 2024.

[25]Male, aged 40-50 years, Zakarpattia oblast, January 2024 and male, aged 40-50 years, Zhytomyr oblast, March 2024.

[26]Male, aged 40-50 years, Lviv oblast, April 2024 and male, aged 20-30 years, Chernivtsi oblast, January 2024.

Determinants of Social Cohesion in War: Fate or Choice?

To what extent do individuals in war relate to each other based on their "fated" traits and to what extent based on their choices? In the following, we articulate alternative theories as to whether war in general, and a war of national survival in particular, is an occasion to close ranks around fated traits, such as ethnic descent, or whether it should lower the relevance of group-membership and heighten the importance of the choice to support/resist the aggression. We articulate these alternative theories, before addressing how fate and choice might interact. In order to develop testable hypotheses, we draw on a well-established proxy of social cohesion and reintegration—individuals' willingness to accept someone as their neighbor[27]—a measure that is relevant while conflict is still ongoing and after it ends.

A Psychological Approach: Inter-Group Bias

Psychological research has firmly established the importance of bias based on identity or membership in ethnic, religious, or political groups in shaping mass attitudes (Tajfel et al. 1979). Two powerful biases are favoritism toward one's own in-group and prejudice against an out-group (Brewer 1979). Ethnic or racial bias has been shown to structure vote-choice (Sigelman et al. 1995), preferences for redistribution (Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist 2012), and post-conflict reconciliation (Tropp et al. 2017; Rapp, Kijewski and Freitag 2019). Members of ethnic out-groups are seen as less peaceful (Brewer 1999), harder to empathize with (Batson and Ahmad 2009), and they are judged more harshly when they commit crimes (David 2014).

Although the influence of war on identities is somewhat under-explored in the literature,[28] the argument prevails that conflict consolidates and homogenizes identities, thus prompting polarization along existing group lines (Esteban and Schneider 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Posen 1993) and increasing the relevance

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[27]See, i.a., Schuman and Bobo (1988); Strabac and Listhaug (2008); Kao and Revkin (2023).

[28]Exceptions include Esteban and Schneider (2008); Kalyvas (2003); Wood (2008); Sambanis and Shayo (2013).

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of group-based bias for how individuals relate to each other. Particularly in a war where a minority is, through ethnic descent, linked to an outside aggressor, we might expect individuals to close ranks around the in-group and exhibit strong bias against members of the out-group. This argument is supported by recent studies that show outgroup-bias against identity groups associated with former enemy combatants such as ISIL in Iraq (Kao, Fabbe and Petersen 2023), Colombia (Agneman and Strömbom 2023), and Afghanistan (Butt 2024). It suggests that in Ukraine, out-group bias is a barrier to acceptance, so being of Russian "ethnic descent" (етнічною належністю)[29] has a negative effect on being preferred as neighbor (H1).

Moreover, existing literature suggests that conflict-affected populations stigmatize civilians exposed to occupation (Revkin 2021), even though having lived under occupation is primarily a matter of fate not choice. Of course, if individuals' choices are unknown, having survived occupation might raise the suspicion that they collaborated, so it would implicate both fate and choice. However, if individuals' choices are known *and* having lived under occupation still creates a barrier to an individual's integration, this would corroborate that respondents treat surviving occupation as a fated trait and the relevant individuals as members of an immutable out-group. The psychological theory hence gives rise to the expectation that (regardless of their choices) individuals who previously lived under Russian occupation are less likely to be preferred as neighbors (H2).

A Moral Approach

Some social-identities are chosen, but ethnic descent is an ascriptive identity that individuals do not chose and cannot alter. As such it is *prima facie* "morally arbitrary;" it neither allows inferences about a person's character, nor does a person deserve blame or praise for their ethnic descent. When relating to others, morality demands that such unchosen traits are irrelevant (Barry 2017). Conduct, in contrast, engages a person's character and responsibility. Contributing to an unjust ag-

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[29]The Ukrainian term for Ukrainian ethnicity, which is distinct from a different term that refers to Ukrainian nationality (національність).

gression through collaboration with the aggressor is morally blameworthy, while resistance in this context is praise-worthy (McMahan 2009). This choice should therefore shape preferences for individuals, as measured by the host community's willingness to accept them as neighbors.

Indeed in war, the perceived moral relevance of even small differences in conduct may be heightened since the stakes in how the members of the threatened group behave are particularly high. The graver the threat to the nation, the more sensitive individuals should be to each other's morally relevant choices. During a war of national survival, we should consequently expect that individuals prefer neighbors that defend the nation regardless of whether they are members of their ethnic in-group. The moral theory hence grounds the expectation that the more (or less) significant an individual's contribution to Ukraine's (Russia's) winning the war, the more (or less) likely they are to be preferred as neighbor (H3).

How does moral significance of conduct vary? Generally, providing information is perceived as a less significant contribution to an unjust aggression or justified resistance than fighting, meaning fighting should have a larger effect on being preferred than sharing information.[30] The moral significance of conduct varies not only by its causal significance, but also by whether the choice to contribute to Ukraine's resistance or Russia's aggression has been made reluctantly or freely. We conceive of "reluctantly" and "freely" as degrees of voluntariness and expect that the positive (negative) effect of an individual's contribution to Ukraine's (Russia's) winning the war is weaker when the individual is acting reluctantly and stronger when the individual is acting freely (H4).

Interactions of Fate and Choice

What about the *relative* importance of fated versus chosen traits and potential interactions between these factors? A moral theory not only postulates the irrelevance of fated traits like ethnic descent, it also rules them out as a legitimate proxy for in-

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[30]However, there are circumstances in which providing information is more likely to be necessary for a specific attack or operation, if an individual possesses information no one else has.

ferring someone's choices; regardless of whether choices are known or unknown, ethnic descent should not affect how an individual's choices are evaluated. The moral theory simply discounts unchosen traits. A psychological approach meanwhile predicts that group-based bias matters, particularly in the face of aggression, but does not rule out that choices also shape how individuals are perceived. Moreover, ethnic bias could not only create a barrier to acceptance of members of the out-group as neighbors regardless of their choices, as hypothesised above, but could also moderate how an individual's choices are evaluated.[31]

Concretely, out-group bias could mean that individuals judge members of an out-group more harshly and are less likely to forgive them (Gibson 2002). We would hence expect that the negative effect of more significant collaboration with Russia is larger for individuals of Russian versus Ukrainian descent and the positive effect of resistance is smaller (H5). Yet, ethnic bias can also create an opposite dynamic in which individuals hold members of their own group to higher standards and punish them more harshly for violations of group norms or expectations. This dynamic, described by Fearon and Laitin (1996) as "in-group policing," would mean that the negative effect of more significant collaboration with Russia is larger for individuals of Ukrainian versus Russian descent and the positive effect of resistance is smaller (H6).

What about having lived under occupation? As mentioned, if it creates a psychological barrier to integration regardless of someone's choices, it is treated as a fated trait and survivors of occupation as a stigmatized out-group. This however, would not preclude that having lived under occupation modifies how choices are evaluated in line with a moral approach. Resistance under occupation is often significantly costlier and riskier than resistance beyond the grasp of the aggressor, which makes it more morally praiseworthy. In turn, holding voluntariness constant, collaborating with the enemy outside an area of occupation is more blameworthy than the same conduct under occupation, since the transgression requires

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[31]Since an individual's choices are known in our study, we rule out that ethnic descent is used as a proxy to infer them, which is also in reality possible.

more effort. The moral theory hence grounds the expectation that the positive effect of an individual's contribution to Ukraine's winning the war is stronger for an individual living under Russian rather than Ukrainian control (H7a) and the negative effect of collaboration is weaker under Russian control (H7b).

We conceived of "keeping one's head down" as the mid-point between active resistance and active collaboration. Whether keeping one's head down is considered equally acceptable under Russian and Ukrainian control may reveal the expectations of minimal resistance that Ukrainians have of each other. If an individual who keeps their head down under occupation is preferred to an individual who keeps their head down in an area under Ukrainian control, this might imply that Ukrainian citizens think they have a duty of resistance. If there is no difference between two such individuals, Ukrainian citizens consider keeping one's head down acceptable and active resistance by passing information or fighting against the aggressor a matter of moral supererogation or "heroism." Table 1 summarizes our expectations associated with the psychological and moral theories.

Table 1: Summary of Expectations: Experiment I (Fate or Choice)

Theory	Profile Attributes			
	Ethnic descent (Russian)	Place of residence (Russian control)	Conduct (Collaboration/Resistance)	Voluntariness (Free Choice)
Psychological	Negative†	Negative	—	—
Moral	—	—◇	Negative/Positive	Increases Conduct Effect
Hypothesis	H1	H2	H3	H4

† Increases effect of collaboration, decreases effect of resistance H5.
† Decreases effect of collaboration, increases effect of resistance H6.
◇ Decreases effect of collaboration, increases effect of resistance H7.

Note: This table summarizes our main expectations for the effects of profile attributes on respondents' preferences among different potential neighbors who vary in relevant attributes including the nature of their collaboration or resistance (Experiment I: Fate vs. Choice). For each theory, we show the predicted effect of an attribute value on an individual's likelihood to be preferred/rated highly as neighbor.

As mentioned above, branding an individual a "collaborator" raises the question of whether they can be redeemed, for instance, through punishment or an apology. A psychological theory would again suggest that being of Russian ethnic descent is a barrier to redemption (H1), while the moral theory implies that solely the causal significance of collaboration determines an individual's potential for redemption when exposure to occupation and the voluntariness of collaboration are

held constant (H3). In a second experiment (Experiment II: Redemption), we investigate furthermore whether two justice mechanisms—a public apology (H8) or an appropriate prison sentence (H9)—can increase the acceptability of a former collaborator as neighbor. To further gauge the influence of in-group bias on collaborators' prospects of redemption, we test the expectations that ethnic descent modifies these effects. Being of Russian descent could weaken the redemptive effects of an apology (H10a) and of an appropriate prison sentence (H11a) due to anti-Russian out-group bias. Alternatively, higher expectations of members of the in-group could mean that the redemptive effects of an apology (10b) and of an appropriate prison sentence (11b) are weaker for collaborators of ethnic Ukrainian descent. Table 2 summarizes these additional expectations.

Table 2: Summary of Expectations: Experiment II (Redemption)

Theory	Profile Attributes			
	Ethnic descent (Russian)	Collaboration (Voluntary/under Occupation)	Apology	Prison Sentence
Psychological	Negative†	—	—	—
Moral	—	Negative	—	—
	—	—	Positive	Positive
Hypothesis	H1	H3	H8	H9

† Decreases the positive effect of apology H10a, and of a prison sentence H11a.
† Increases the positive effect of apology H10b, and of a prison sentence H11b.

Note: This table summarizes our main expectations for the effects of profile attributes on respondents' preferences for an individual as neighbour. For each theory, we show the predicted effect of an attribute value on an individual's likelihood to be preferred/rated highly as neighbor.

Research Design, Ethics & Implementation

To test our theories, we conducted a representative survey of 2,513 Ukrainian citizens living in *oblasti* (regions) that were controlled by the Ukrainian government, and safe and accessible for enumerators, at the time of fielding the survey in April 2024. The study was approved by the ethical review board of redacted University and pre-registered.[32] The following section summarizes our experimental designs, sampling procedure and implementation, ethical considerations, and estimation

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[32]The de-identified pre-analysis plan is available at: `https://osf.io/sr542`. Appendix Table A4 presents a side-by-side comparison of the pre-registered hypotheses and how they are reported in the paper.

strategy with additional details in Appendix A-C.

Experimental Designs

We embedded our experiments to investigate the relative importance of fate versus choice for the acceptance of individuals as neighbors (Experiment I) and to study prospects of reintegration of individuals who collaborated (Experiment II) in a survey. Each respondent was given a tablet to complete three rounds of Experiment I and half of the respondents then completed three rounds of Experiment II.[33] Enumerators were instructed not to listen or look at respondents' answers to ensure their privacy and minimize potential social desirability bias.[34] For each round of Experiments I and II, respondents were presented with two conjoint profiles describing fictional individuals with randomly varying attributes. For each respondent and experiment, we randomly varied the order of attributes in order to account for potential ordering effects.[35]

Table 3 summarizes the attributes and attribute values of the conjoint profiles for Experiment I. In accordance with our theory, the profiles vary by ethnic descent (Russian or Ukrainian), whether they lived under Russian occupation in the three months before moving next door, their conduct during those months ranging from resistance by supporting Ukraine (either by providing information or fighting) to collaboration with Russia (again, by either sharing information or fighting), and the voluntariness of this conduct. We also added age and gender without specifying expectations about the effects of these attributes on respondents' preferences.

Respondents were first asked to make a forced choice between the two profiles: "Please imagine that the apartment / house next door to you becomes vacant right

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[33]The other half of respondents completed a third experiment on preferences for different transitional justice mechanisms, which is reported in a separate paper. To facilitate implementation by surveyors, in each random-walk based chain of interviews in a location, experiments I+II or I+III are assigned to even and odd respondent numbers, respectively.

[34]In a small number of interviews, respondents asked the enumerator to hold the tablet while they pressed the buttons

[35]We only fix attribute positions (A3.1 in vignette) or order (A1.4 directly precedes A1.5) where necessary to preserve the internal consistency of the task. Thus, each respondent sees the same attribute order for each experiment, but the order randomly varies between respondents.

now. If you had to choose between the following two individuals, who would you choose to move in and become your neighbor?" To address the potential concern that respondents might refuse both options, respondents were then asked to rate each profile: "Thinking only of the first/second individual, how much would you oppose/favor if this individual moved into the apartment / house next door?"

Table 3: Experiment I Profile Attributes: Fate or Choice

Attribute	Levels
Ethnic descent	Russian Ukrainian
Age	25 40 55
Gender	Woman Man
Exposure to occupation	**Place of residence in last 3 months before moving here:** Was controlled by the Russian government Was controlled by the Ukrainian government
Voluntariness	**In the last 3 months:** *reluctantly* decided to *freely* decided to
Type of action	fight alongside Russian forces give information to Russian forces keep their head down give information to Ukrainian forces fight alongside Ukrainian forces

Table 4 presents the design of Experiment II. We again varied ethnic descent and an individual's conduct. However, we narrowed the behavioral attribute to three levels of collaboration with Russia that are punishable under Ukrainian law, in contrast to Experiment I which also includes actions in support of Ukraine. In addition to the two forms of collaboration included in Experiment I, providing information and fighting for Russia, we added a third: evasion of Ukraine's mandatory conscription of men from age 25-60 as a baseline of punishable conduct (Khurshudyan 2024). We also held gender constant (male) to ensure realism because Ukraine's draft does not apply to women. Voluntariness and exposure to occupation were likewise held constant. Respondents were therefore told that a hypothetical col-

Table 4: Experiment II Profile Attributes: Redemption and Reintegration

Attribute	Levels
Ethnic descent	Russian
	Ukrainian
Age	25
	40
	55
Gender	Man
Conduct	Evaded conscription into the Ukrainian army
	Gave information to Russian forces
	Fought for Russian forces
Punishment	Less than the appropriate level
	Appropriate
	More than the appropriate level
Contrition	The individual publicly apologized
	The individual declined to publicly apologize

laborator's conduct was "deliberate" and that they were not living under Russian occupation.

In addition, we added two potential redemptive mechanisms: whether or not the collaborator publicly apologized and the severity of the collaborator's prison sentence. Previous survey experiments that attempt to estimate the effects of punishment severity on the likelihood of former offenders' reintegration have raised the concern that harsher punishments (e.g., a lifetime prison sentence) may unintentionally convey signals about a person's dangerousness or culpability, making it impossible to disentangle the independent effects of punishment from the effects of the stigma associated with harsher punishments (Revkin and Kao 2024). To mitigate this concern, we defined three levels of punishment in terms of proportionality to the severity of the offense: less than appropriate, appropriate, and more than appropriate.

Experiments I and II were followed by a series of post-treatment questions designed to gauge whether conflict-affectedness, other standard demographics, or political attitudes modify individuals' attitudes toward collaboration, resistance, and redemption.

Sampling and Implementation

The sample of 2,513 individuals was designed to be representative of all Ukrainian oblasti except for Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea, including internally displaced individuals and refugees.[36] Our four-stage random sampling strategy closely follows Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon (2023) and is described in more detail in the Appendix A. Figure 1a illustrates the approximate locations of the PSUs and Figure 1 shows the locations of battles, remote violence, and one-sided violence committed by the Russian Army and allies during the war up to March 2024.

Among potential participants in households successfully contacted by enumerators, the response rate was 45%, comparable to other recent in-person surveys in Ukraine (Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon 2023) and much higher than internet- or phone-based surveys.[37] To ensure the ethical integrity of the survey, enumerators were instructed to strictly exclude any potential participants who appeared incapable of giving informed consent for reasons including drug or alcohol intoxication or advanced age. Enumerators made contact with 145 potential respondents who met these criteria and therefore did not initiate interviews. All respondents who started the survey completed it. Overall, the high response rate and completion rate in the context of our careful informed consent process indicate that respondents did not perceive the survey as overly sensitive.

Our sample[38] had a slight gender imbalance: 45% male and 55% female, which likely reflects the military conscription of men between the ages of 25-60. 56% of respondents reported economic hardship, 71% identified their families as affected by the war, and 7% had IDPs living in their households. 95% of the sample identified as ethnically Ukrainian and only 4% identified as ethnically Russian. While 11% of all respondents identified Russian as their native language, 20% of the interviews were conducted in Russian and 80% in Ukrainian.

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[36]Note that we had limited coverage of Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv oblast.

[37]For example, De Rassenfosse, Murovana and Uhlbach (2023) report a response rate of 19.3% on an email-based survey of Ukrainian scientists.

[38]For summary statistics, see Appendix Table A1.

(a) 250 Sampled Locations

Note: PSUs plotted with random displacement by up to .2 degrees in every direction.

(b) Battles, remote violence, and one-sided violence committed by the Russian Army and allies between February 2022 and March 2024.

Note: Data from Raleigh et al. (2010).

Figure 1: Primary sampling units and conflict events in Ukraine since 2022

Research Ethics

Drawing on insights gained during preliminary fieldwork and qualitative interviews as well as best practices for ethical and safe field research in the Russia-Ukraine war (Howlett and Lazarenko 2023), we prioritized the protection of research participants at all stages of the design and data collection. In line with our approved ethics protocol, all respondents gave their informed consent and could withdraw from the survey at any time. This included the possibility for respondents to dodge the "forced" choice outcome in the conjoint experiment without terminating the interview.[39]

To ensure that our survey questions, including both experiments, were culturally appropriate and realistic, we designed and extensively piloted the questions over the course of many months of fieldwork, interviews with ordinary citizens, and discussions with Ukrainian colleagues. One of the authors is a Ukrainian speaker and closely supervised translation. We also prioritized enumerator and respondent safety by assuring our Ukrainian partners that failing to complete interviews due to security concerns would not have monetary consequences for them. We also stayed in close contact with the survey firm during the implementation of the survey.

Estimation Strategy

We test the observable implications of psychological and moral theories about collaboration and resistance by estimating Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE, Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014), defined as the marginal effect of an attribute level across all other attribute levels. To facilitate the discussion and presentation of the results, the main discussion is limited to the forced `choice` outcome, but the Appendix contains all results for profile `scores` which we highlight where results deviate. For descriptive purposes, we report Marginal Means (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020), which represent the mean outcome across

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[39]As discussed below, the resulting selection does not bias our results when compared to the rating outcomes which was answered by all respondents.

all appearances of a particular conjoint feature level, averaging across all other features. Where testing arguments about interactions between attributes, we estimate AMCEs as well as Marginal Means for the respective sub-groups. In order to facilitate comparisons of AMCEs and Marginal Means across attributes with differing attribute numbers, we adjust all estimates for the `choice` outcome for the co-occurrence in attribute levels (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020).[40]

Results

Experiment I provides support for *both* moral and psychological theories: Respondents reacted primarily and strongly to profiles' voluntary choices on the spectrum from collaboration to resistance. At the same time, respondents showed significant ethnic bias and "occupation stigma." Interestingly, both fated traits interact with choices in ways predicted by the theory of in-group policing, with resistance having stronger positive effects and collaboration having weaker negative effects on acceptance of ethnically Russian profiles in comparison with ethnic Ukrainians. These findings suggest that Ukrainians have higher baseline expectations of resistance from ethnic Ukrainians and expect less resistance and more collaboration from ethnic Russians. Accordingly, ethnic Ukrainians who collaborate are penalized more than ethnic Russians.

Low ratings of collaborator profiles and the finding that "keeping one's head down" is significantly less acceptable in territories under Ukrainian control suggest that respondents have high baseline expectations of resistance and a low threshold for rejecting potential neighbors based on either fated traits (ethnic descent and occupation stigma) or indeed their choices (collaboration or neutrality).

While Experiment I provides evidence of steep moral and psychological barri-

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[40]We do so by dropping, for each attribute separately, all profiles without variation in that attribute from the data when estimating AMCEs and Marginal Means. Note that we report non-adjusted AMCE and Marginal Mean estimates for the choice outcomes in Figures A6 and A22 for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Comparing non-adjusted estimates across attributes is difficult as they are more downward biased the fewer levels an attribute has, as this increases the number of tasks without variation on the attribute. Because `scores` are assigned by respondent to each profile, this bias does not affect them.

ers to reintegration, Experiment II explores whether redemptive mechanisms can overcome these barriers. We find that opposition to reintegration of collaborators cannot be overcome through criminal punishment and is only partially mitigated by apologies. These results suggest that victim-centered and restorative justice mechanisms such as apologies may be more effective for facilitating the rehabilitation and reintegration of former collaborators in Ukraine than more punitive and perpetrator-focused mechanisms.

Experiment I: Fate versus Choice in the Assessment of Neighbors

The results of Experiment I show clearly that our respondents react strongly to both, ethnic descent in line with H1 and chosen conduct in line with H3 when making forced choices among potential neighbors. Figure 2 depicts the main estimates for attributes' AMCEs and Marginal Means. When comparing fated with chosen attributes, a hypothetical neighbor's conduct has the strongest effect on their probability of being chosen in comparison with a second profile. Collaborators who fought with Russia are chosen in only 22 percent of all pairs where respondents had the option of rejecting them. Hypothetical individuals who provided information to Russia are only slightly more likely to be chosen (24 percent of all pairs). These collaborators are 37 and 35 percentage points less likely selected than those who kept their heads down. In contrast, those who resisted by fighting for Ukraine were selected in 74 percent of all comparisons, or 15 percentage points more often than those who kept their heads down.

In line with expectations derived from the moral theory, the effects of conduct are amplified—positively for resistance and negatively for collaboration—when the individual is acting freely rather than reluctantly (H4). As shown in Figure 3, reluctance shrinks the negative effect of collaboration with Russia from -51 to -23 percentage points in comparison with voluntary collaboration. Importantly, reluctance also reduces the positive effect of supporting Ukraine's resistance from 17 to 11 percentage points compared to the baseline of keeping one's head down. The

Figure 2: Experiment I AMCE and Marginal Mean Estimates

Note: Results for forced choice outcomes, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Reference points for AMCE estimates indicated by points without confidence intervals. See Figure A6 for estimates without co-occurrence adjustment.

joint difference between the AMCEs for reluctant and free behavior are highly statistically significant (p< .001). While the overall low rates of acceptance of collaborators indicate steep barriers to reintegration, Ukrainians clearly differentiate between voluntary and coerced collaboration and judge the latter much less harshly. This suggests some potential for reconciliation at least in Russian-occupied areas where collaboration was often forced at gunpoint.

Yet, in addition to chosen conduct, the fated ethnic identities of the individuals presented in the profiles also mattered for our respondents. On average, the results show a clear anti-Russian bias that is both substantively and statistically significant. Being of Russian descent reduces a potential neighbor's average `choice` probability of being chosen by 28 percentage points from 64 to 36 percent. Consistent with this being reflective of an outgroup-bias by ethnic Ukrainians, the bias against individuals of Russian descent is not present among ethnically Russian survey respondents (Figure A9). Importantly for theories of civic nationalism in Ukraine, anti-Russian bias is muted or even absent among the (relatively few) re-

Figure 3: Collaboration vs. resistance by voluntariness

Note: Results for forced choice outcomes by subgroups, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Reference points for AMCE estimates indicated by points without confidence intervals.

spondents who consider themselves ethnic Ukrainians but do not think that "being truly Ukrainian" requires Ukrainian ancestry, speaking Ukrainian, or adhering to cultural norms and traditions (Figure A10).

We also find significant stigma associated with the experience of occupation. Having previously lived under Ukrainian instead of Russian control increases a potential neighbor's `choice` probability by 12 percent from 44 to 56 percent in line with H2. Age and gender, as the two other identity attributes, have only negligible effects.

Fated identities not only matter on their own, they also moderate respondents' evaluations of collaboration and resistance. In line with the hypothesis that respondents have higher expectations of members of their in-group than out-group (H6), we find smaller negative effects of collaboration for ethnically Russian profiles in comparison with ethnically Ukrainian profiles. As Figure 4 shows, individuals of Russian descent who actively collaborated with Russia are 29 percentage points less likely to be selected than a hypothetical individual who kept their head down, whereas the respective penalty for those of Ukrainian descent is 41 percentage points. Similarly, the positive effect of fighting in support of Ukraine as

compared to keeping one's head down is stronger for individuals of Russian ethnic descent (18 percentage points) compared to those individuals of Ukrainian descent (9 percentage points).

Importantly, higher expectations for individuals of Ukrainian as compared to Russian descent are also present among respondents who answered the survey in Russian (Figure A12). In addition, the interactions of fate and choice are similar in direction but not as pronounced when we interact conduct attributes with whether a profiled individual had lived under Russian occupation or not (H7). A potential neighbor's collaboration under Ukrainian control has a larger negative effect on their likelihood of acceptance than one who collaborated under Russian control, although resistance is not valued significantly more highly under occupation (Figure A11).

Still, a sizeable gap in the selection probability remains between individuals of Russian and Ukrainian descent that cannot be fully overcome through choices of resistance, which we attribute to the persistence of anti-Russian bias. As seen in the Marginal Means estimates in Figure 4, ethnic Russians who fought with Ukraine are selected 15 percentage points less often than ethnic Ukrainians who kept their heads down. Only when individuals of Ukrainian descent collaborate with Russia are they not (on average) preferred over those of Russian descent who kept their heads down or resisted.

Experiment II: Paths to Reintegration of Collaborators

In Experiment II, we assess whether the prospects for redemption and reintegration of collaborators with Russia differ depending on an individual's ethnic descent. To do so, we compare three levels of collaboration that vary in severity from evading Ukraine's draft (the minimum punishable baseline offense) to more severe acts of collaboration: providing information to Russia and fighting for Russia. We then explore the effects of two potential redemptive mechanisms: criminal punishment in the form of a prison sentence, varying in severity across three levels (low, appro-

Figure 4: Experiment 1: Effects of collaboration vs. resistance by profile's ethnic descent

Note: Results for forced choice outcomes by subgroups, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Reference points for AMCE estimates indicated by points without confidence intervals.

priate, high), and whether or not the collaborator apologizes.

Figure 5 presents the main results. Consistent with Experiment I, we find a strong aversion toward all collaborators with Russia. Providing information to Russia decreases the likelihood of reintegration by 50 percentage points and fighting for Russia decreases the likelihood of reintegration by 55 percentage points. Importantly, we also find evidence of ethnic bias against collaborators of Russian descent who are 19 percentage points less likely to be reintegrated than collaborators of Ukrainian descent. This aversion is also reflected in the average score given to profiles which amounts to only .21 on a scale from 0 to 1.[41]

Apologies have some positive effect on the likelihood of reintegration, consistent with H8. Collaborators who apologize are, on average, chosen in 64 percent of all forced-choice comparisons—28 percentage points more often than those who do not apologize. Interestingly, we do not find that this effect differs by profiles' ethnic descent (Figure A25), contrary to H10(a) and H10(b). This suggests that the act of apologizing may help overcome out-group bias against collaborators of Russian

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[41]This compares to an average score of .36 in Experiment I, which included many more "positive" attribute combinations in the eyes of respondents.

Figure 5: Experiment II AMCE and Marginal Mean Estimates

Note: Results for forced choice outcomes, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Reference points for AMCE estimates indicated by points without confidence intervals. See Figure A22 for estimates without co-occurrence adjustment.

descent as well as an in-group policing or expectation bias against collaborators of Ukrainian descent.

Importantly, punishment does not increase the likelihood of a profile being accepted as a respondent's neighbor, thus rejecting H9. Instead, the AMCE estimates for appropriate and high levels of punishment amount to a precisely estimated zero. The effect of punishment does not vary by profiles' ethnic descent (Figure A23) or the respondent's language (Figure A24), and does not moderate the effect of their conduct either (Figure A27).

These findings suggest that respondents do not perceive criminal prosecution and punishment as redemptive. This finding should, however, not be misunderstood as implying that criminal punishment of collaborators is not important to survey respondents. To the contrary, the results of a third experiment in the same survey, which are reported in a separate paper, suggest that Ukrainians consistently support the application of criminal justice to collaborators.

Addressing Potential Threats to Inference

In this section, we address potential threats to inference and summarize steps taken to mitigate them, namely selection through non-response on the forced choice. The experimental tasks asked respondents to `score` each individual profile and make a forced `choice` between them. While scores were always given, respondents quite frequently refused to make a forced choice. This occurred in 17.7 percent of all tasks in Experiment I and in 30.3 percent of tasks in Experiment II. Given that this poses a potentially serious threat to the internal validity of our analysis, Appendix C presents the results of an in-depth analysis into the patterns and consequences of non-response on the forced `choice` item.

Analyzing the correlates of non-response (Appendix Figure A1), we find that non-response occurs overwhelmingly in tasks where (1) profiles were rated very badly or at zero—driven by the respective attributes, e.g. collaboration with Russia. In Experiment I, response rates on the choice outcome are 62.8 percentage points higher where at least one profile was rated above zero. (2) Another important factor behind non-responses consists in invariance among important attributes within a pair.[42] Respondents were then often unwilling to choose between two very disliked options.

Reassuringly, we only find minor demographic and attitudinal imbalances between the respondents who refused to choose between two profiles and those who were willing to choose one (Appendix D). Because characteristics of profiles, tasks, and respondents themselves drive the selection of respondents into completing the forced choice between profiles, any estimate of the effects of attribute levels on the forced choice outcome might be biased. We assess the likely direction and severity of this bias in three ways.

We first leverage the fact that all respondents always scored all profiles. We can thus compare AMCEs on the score outcome for the full sample with AMCEs for the forced-choice outcome in the reduced sample of tasks where the forced choice was

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[42]Note that non-response for pairs without variation on an attribute does not affect co-occurrence adjusted estimates for that attributes.

also completed. This is the approach we take when discussing the results above, flagging where results between the two do not align with each other. Second, we take further advantage of the profile scores and compare AMCEs for the full sample with those from the reduced sample of tasks where the forced choice was also completed. The respective estimates do not differ from each other in a substantively or statistically significant manner (Figures A2 and A3).

Third, we balance our analysis of the choice outcomes after reweighting each response by the inverse predicted probability of respondents' completing the choice in a particular task, thus up-weighting responses in tasks in which fewer choices were made. Probabilities are predicted using a logistic regression model with predictors that indicate whether a given attribute varied in the task and the average level it took, as well as interactions between these variables. Again, the respective results closely align with the unweighted results, showing that selection bias is very unlikely to have caused the patterns described above.

Further Robustness Checks

We follow our pre-analysis plan and present, in the Appendix, results from additional robustness checks that address potential caveats of our research design and estimation strategy. We first weight respondents by the number of individuals in their household to address the oversampling of households with few members. This does not change the results. Second, we vary the clustering of standard errors, including clustering at the level of PSUs. The latter increases confidence intervals slightly, but does not affect the substantive interpretation of our results. Lastly, we find no evidence of effects of the (randomized) order in which attributes were presented to respondents.

Conclusion

The question how conflict-affected populations assess individuals' choices to resist, collaborate, or keep their heads down, particularly under occupation, is ur-

gent in many conflicts over territory around the world. While scholarship has shown that "fated" traits influence attitudes in some contexts, our findings from Ukraine demonstrate that individuals' choices and ethnic descent both matter and interact with each other. Collaboration with the enemy is punished and resistance rewarded, even more so if realized voluntarily. Yet, descent from the ethnic out-group also serves as a barrier to re-integration, in that members of the out-group are generally viewed as less acceptable neighbors. Ethnic descent furthermore *moderates* how conduct is evaluated. Specifically, we found that out-group members are punished less for failing to resist and that collaboration depresses the acceptability of in-group members more than that of out-group members. Moreover, our findings show that having survived occupation – often suspected to be a proxy for collaboration – matters independently. Even when information on the conduct of an individual is known, having survived occupation decreases their acceptability, creating a stigma properly so-called.

Our findings shed particular light on inter-group relations and social cohesion in war-time Ukraine. In scholarship, as in popular discourses, a dominant narrative is that "being Ukrainian is a choice" and that people are now "less interested in ethnicity".[43] Yet, others report "negative" feelings toward Russian, Russia, and Russians, who they view as "repulsive."[44] Answering whether Ukrainians relate to each other primarily based on their choices or fated traits in the face of Russia's aggression was thus critical for understanding potential challenges to social cohesion and barriers to reintegration that Ukraine will be forced to face after the end of the war. Is it true that "if [you are] helping the army and the people of Ukraine, even if [you] have a Russian surname or [your] ancestors were Russians, you are not rejected or neglected or disrespected"?[45]

Our findings suggest that choices have a substantial effect on how Ukrainians relate to each other, particularly that voluntary choices significantly influence a per-

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[43]Male, aged 30-40 years, Ivanno-Frankivsk oblast, March 2024.
[44]Female, aged 18-30 years, Kyiv city, January 2023.
[45]Male, Soldier, 31 years old, Ivanno-Frankivsk oblast, March 2024

son's chances of being accepted as a neighbor. We do not doubt that a sense of civic national identity is real and meaningful to Ukrainians, especially since Russia's 2022 invasion. However, our study suggests that the dominant narrative of a population united by a civic identity that supersedes ethnic divisions, risks masking substantial bias toward ethnic Russians that prevails in Ukraine. In fact, we found that an individual of Russian ethnic descent cannot fully overcome the rejection associated with this ascriptive identity trait by fighting with Ukraine. Rather, an ethnic Ukrainian who kept their head down will still be more accepted as a neighbor. The fact that ethnic Ukrainians expect more resistance of each other than of ethnic Russians reveals complex nuances around national identity in Ukraine that are overlooked by the dominant civic frame.

Moreover, we found that Ukrainian citizens' expectations of each other are generally very high and even "keeping your head down" in government-controlled areas is viewed negatively. This first survey experiment about attitudes toward collaboration with a population struggling to expel an external aggressor set on conquest from its territory hence supports the theory based on WWII-era evidence that a threat to the survival of the nation heightens expectations of resistance (Röling 1960, 437). That same historical evidence implies a cautionary tale about the implosion of social cohesion that such an external threat to the survival of the nation can cause, particularly in areas occupied by the aggressor. We see some evidence for this in our data: failure to resist Russia's aggression was a reason to rate profiles of fictional individuals very low and even a reason for respondents to reject choosing one of two profiles deemed unacceptable. These high expectations of resistance, paired with the small redemptive effect of an apology and the failure of criminal punishment to *at all* redeem former collaborators point to significant challenges to social cohesion in Ukraine now. They also highlight an uphill battle for post-conflict reintegration of individuals whose choices or fated traits are judged harshly.

It is important to note that where conflict-affected populations draw the line

between acceptable and unacceptable neighbors does not reveal what kind of contact with the enemy—by whom and under what conditions—is morally justified or should be legally or politically redeemable. Mass attitudes are not a repository of moral truth, yet understanding them is morally and politically important. Awareness of the ineffectiveness of punishment in redeeming alleged collaborators and of the extent of inter-group bias is critical for the design of policies that are effective in reintegrating alleged collaborators and in counter-acting inter-group tensions. While many transitional justice processes prescribe some vetting or lustration, the wholesale exclusion of groups of people, for instance those with occupation stigma or with certain ascriptive traits, is widely considered a hindrance to post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration. It risks decreasing support for democracy (Horne 2009; Capoccia and Pop-Eleches 2020), causing cycles of revenge (Minow 1999), increasing extremist ideologies (Mako 2021), and it can even lead to conflict recurrence (McFate 2007). The stakes in setting the stage for effective post-conflict reconciliation are high.

We argued that Ukraine is a hard case for the theory that collaborators can be reintegrated and for the expectation that individuals differentiate based on the severity of collaboration in how they relate to each other. While the first claim proved unequivocally true, we found that respondents paid significant attention to the voluntariness of conduct when they assessed acts of collaboration. We set up the study so that respondents had no reason to use voluntariness of collaboration as proxy for occupation or ethnic descent and still found that it had a significant effect. Since individuals caught-up between warring parties often face severe restrictions on their freedom and typically have few options, future research might investigate whether spreading awareness among conflict-affected populations about coercion in conflict settings can improve reintegration of alleged collaborators. For ordinary people in war, it is after all a common fate to have no real choice at all.

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Supplementary Material

Table of Contents

A   Sampling Procedure

Our four-stage random sampling strategy closely follows Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon (2023). First, the sample size was stratified by oblasti in proportion to their population size as available in the latest electoral statistics from 2019. Second, we stratified by urban/rural voting precincts, our primary sampling units (PSU) within each oblast. Third, the survey firm randomly selected PSUs for each stratum with probabilities proportional to the estimated population of each PSU. The survey was conducted in a total of 250 PSUs, with 10 interviews conducted in each PSU. Fourth, within each selected PSU, street and house or apartment numbers were randomly selected as the starting points for interviewers. Sex and age quotas are derived from the latest statistics for each PSU. If a household agreed to the interview, the interviewer determined whether there were household members who fit the sex and age quota, of which only 1 respondent per household was surveyed.

B   Preliminary Interviews

The twenty interviews presented in this paper motivated the design of the two survey experiments. The interviews are a small sample of a much larger database of qualitative data, involving 101 interviews and 12 focus groups, collected by one of the authors and the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) between February 2022 to April 2024. Ethics approvals for the projects by the author were granted by [Redacted] University under SSHDPIRC1A23012amendment02 and SSHOSGAREESC123103amendment01.

As per the ethics review, best practices for participant and researcher safety were closely followed throughout the qualitative data collection, including a detailed informed consent process, frequent reminders of participants' volunariness in the study, and strong data and security protocols. Interviewees were randomly selected and recruited through snowball and convenience sampling, drawing on one of the author's and the DIF's pre-existing networks in Ukraine. All participants were Ukrainian citizens who remained in Ukraine following Russia's 2022 invasion, the inclusion criteria for all projects. While all interlocutors were in Ukraine at the time of the interview, six of the twenty conversations were conducted in-person by the DIF and fourteen were conducted online by one of the authors.

The interviews were conducted in English, Ukrainian, and Russian, based on the preference of each participant. All interviewees are anonymised to protect their identities, which is especially important with the war in Ukraine ongoing. As an additional precaution to ensure anonymity, we specify only the month and year of the interviews and a ten-year age range for participants' ages.

C   Selection

One potential threat to inference is that a respondent's likelihood of making any choice in a given task might be driven by demographic attributes such as gender or war-affectedness. To assess this possibility, Figure A1 examines correlates of non-response on the forced choice task across all three experiments. Red points indicate

Table A1: Respondent-level summary statistics: Demographics

Statistic	N	Mean
Gender		
Male	1121	0.45
Female	1392	0.55
Age (5 groups)		
18-29	404	0.16
30-39	460	0.18
40-49	533	0.21
50-59	393	0.16
60+	723	0.29
Children: yes/no		
No	703	0.28
Yes	1810	0.72
Level of education		
Basic general secondary education	99	0.04
Complete general secondary education	400	0.16
Vocational and technical education	403	0.16
Secondary special education	772	0.31
Higher Education	839	0.33
Economic deprivation		
no	1096	0.44
yes	1389	0.56
Member of UKR Defense		
no	2308	0.95
yes	122	0.05
IDPs in HH		
no	2332	0.93
yes	181	0.07
Rural / Urban		
Rural	994	0.40
Urban	1519	0.60
Interview language		
Russian	515	0.20
Ukrainian	1998	0.80
Native language		
Other	68	0.03
Russian	270	0.11
Ukrainian	2091	0.86
Ukrainian ethnic identity		
no	137	0.05
yes	2376	0.95
Russian ethnic identity		
no	2408	0.96
yes	105	0.04

A2

significant effects. Reassuringly, we only find minor demographic and attitudinal imbalances between the respondents who refused to choose between two profiles and those who were willing to choose one.

For Experiment I, response probabilities are slightly higher among men (+3ppts), younger respondents (-1.6ppts/decade), and those without children (+4.9ppts). Ukrainian ethnic identity has the among the largest positive effects (+6.2ppts). Response probabilities were lower among those living in Oblasti first attacked by the Russians in 2022 (-3.2ppts) but higher among those personally affected by the war (+5.1ppts). The results of this descriptive analysis are substantively similar for Experiment II.

Figure A1: Correlates of response (vs. non-response) on choice items

Note: Variable names and ranges are noted on the y-axis, their mean values in the respective sample in grey. Statistically significant estimates are plotted in red.

Figure A2: Experiment 1: AMCE and Selection Analysis

Figure A3: Experiment 2: AMCE and Selection Analysis

D Experiment I: Additional Results

Figure A4: Experiment 1: AMCE Estimates

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points have no CIs.


Figure A5: Experiment 1: Marginal Means Estimates

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs.

Figure A6: Experiment 1: AMCE and Marginal Mean Estimates on forced choice without co-occurrence adjustment

Note: Results for forced choice outcomes, without adjustment for attribute co-occurrence. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A7: Experiment 1: Collaboration vs. resistance by freedom of choice

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A8: Experiment 1: Collaboration vs. resistance by ethnic descent

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.


Figure A9: Experiment 1: Heterogeneity in AMCE of Russian ethnic descent

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A10: Experiment 1: Heterogeneity in AMCE of Russian ethnic descent by attitudes towards requirements for "being truly Ukrainian"

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.


Figure A11: Experiment I: Collaboration vs. resistance by place of residence

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A12: Experiment 1: Collaboration vs. resistance by ethnic descent and interview language

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A13: Experiment 1: Collaboration vs. resistance by age

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A14: Experiment 1: Collaboration vs. resistance by gender

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.


Figure A15: Experiment 1: Heterogeneity by interview language

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A16: Experiment 1: Heterogeneity by native language

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A17: AMCEs using weights proportional to the size of households

Figure A18: Clustering standard errors the the pair-level.

Figure A19: Order Effects

E   Experiment II: Additional Results

Figure A20: Experiment 2: AMCE Estimates

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points indicated by points without confidence intervals.


Figure A21: Experiment 2: Marginal Means Estimates

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes, adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs.

Figure A22: Experiment 2: AMCE and Marginal Mean Estimates on forced choice without co-occurrence adjustment

Note: Results for forced choice outcomes, without adjustment for attribute co-occurrence. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.


Figure A28: AMCEs using weights proportional to the size of households

Figure A23: Experiment 2: Effect of punishment severity by ethnic descent

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A24: Experiment 2: Effect of punishment severity by ethnic descent and interview language

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A25: Experiment 2: Effect of apologies (yes/no) by ethnic descent

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A26: Experiment 2: Effect of apologies (yes/no) by ethnic descent and interview language

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.

Figure A27: Experiment 2: Conduct and punishment

Note: Results for score and forced choice outcomes. Estimates for choice outcomes are adjusted for attribute co-occurrence to facilitate direct comparisons between estimates. Error bars denote 95% CIs. Reference points for AMCE estimates without CIs.


Figure A29: Clustering standard errors the the pair-level.

Figure A30: Order Effects

F   Heterogeneous Effects

As specified in our pre-analysis plan and summarized in Table A11, we conducted exploratory analyses on potential heterogeneous treatment effects for different respondent characteristics in two categories: demographics and attitudes.

Demographic Variables

For most of the demographic characteristics, we did not specify hypotheses: gender, age, education, several measures of war-affectedness (both self-reported and based on respondents' location derived by spatially intersecting PSU coordinates with conflict data from the ACLED database), and IDP status. We did specify an exploratory hypothesis for respondent's choice of language on the survey as a measure of ethnic identification. Given evidence of an emerging "civic identity" that transcends ethnic divisions, we expected Russian speakers to respond similarly to Ukrainian-speakers with respect to H6, H7, H10, and H11, concerning out-group bias and in-group policing/expectations. Interestingly, our results contradict the "civic identity" hypothesis and support the presence of ethnic biases. Ukrainian-speaking respondents are much more likely to reject ethnically Russian profiles and also much more likely to accept ethnically Ukrainian profiles in comparison with Russian-speaking respondents. Evidence of pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian biases among Russian-speaking respondents is weaker but still present. Russian-speaking respondents are somewhat more likely to accept ethnically Russian profiles and slightly less likely to accept ethnically Ukrainian profiles in comparison with Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

Attitudinal Variables

Post-treatment survey questions measured several attitudinal variables including importance of victory, frequency of contact with neighbors, and trust in neighbors. Of these, we only specified one exploratory hypothesis: We expected the results for Experiments I and II to be weaker for respondents who report having less contact with their neighbors because they should be less affected by or worried about reintegration in comparison with respondents who have more contact with their neighbors. This exploratory hypothesis is not supported by the data. However, we do find that respondents who feel more strongly about victory over Russia are significantly less likely to choose profiles of collaborators.

Table A2: Experiment I: Omnibus Wald-Test Result for Joint Nullity of Heterogenous Effects by Moderator

	Score (0-1)			Forced choice (0/1)		
Moderator	F-Stat	p	Adj. p	F-Stat	p	Adj. p
Demographics						
Gender	0.80	0.63	1	1.85	0.05	1
Age (5 groups)	1.31	0.09	1	1.36	0.07	1
Children: yes/no	1.36	0.19	1	0.69	0.74	1
Level of education	1.34	0.07	1	0.93	0.59	1
Economic deprivation	1.21	0.28	1	1.18	0.30	1
Member of UKR Defense	0.87	0.56	1	1.17	0.31	1
IDPs in HH	1.95	0.03	1	0.92	0.51	1
Rural / Urban	2.39	0.01	0.42	2.26	0.01	0.66
Interview language	6.89	0	0	3.38	0.0002	0.01
Native language	3.33	0.0000	0.0000	2.44	0.0003	0.02
Ukrainian ethnic identity	2.93	0.001	0.06	2.10	0.02	1
Russian ethnic identity	1.95	0.03	1	1.42	0.16	1
Affectedness						
Affectedness score	1.05	0.39	1	0.96	0.51	1
East vs. West	1.19	0.29	1	1.89	0.04	1
Oblast first attacked	1.42	0.17	1	1.53	0.12	1
Self war-affected	2.79	0.002	0.10	1.00	0.44	1
Family war-affected	1.24	0.26	1	1.21	0.28	1
Any one-sided violence	1.47	0.14	1	0.92	0.52	1
Any battles	1.46	0.15	1	0.81	0.61	1
Any shelling	1.82	0.05	1	0.61	0.81	1
Attitudes						
Importance of victory	3.93	0.0000	0.001	2.03	0.03	1
Interaction w/ neighbours	1.55	0.03	1	1.10	0.32	1
Trust in neighbours	1.08	0.35	1	1.04	0.41	1
Higher standards for Russians	1.71	0.07	1	1.51	0.13	1
Higher standards for Ukrainians	1.78	0.06	1	1.34	0.20	1
More forgiving of Russians	1.61	0.10	1	1.58	0.11	1
More forgiving of Ukrainians	1.26	0.25	1	0.63	0.79	1

Note: Adjusted p-values based on a Bonferroni adjustment for 54 hypotheses.

Table A3: Experiment II: Omnibus Wald-Test Result for Joint Nullity of Heterogenous Effects by Moderator

Moderator	Score (0-1)			Forced choice (0/1)		
	F-Stat	p	Adj. p	F-Stat	p	Adj. p
Demographics						
Gender	1.72	0.09	1	1.25	0.26	1
Age (5 groups)	1.48	0.04	1	1.19	0.21	1
Children: yes/no	2.71	0.01	0.31	0.58	0.79	1
Level of education	1.25	0.16	1	1.13	0.29	1
Economic deprivation	1.31	0.23	1	0.65	0.73	1
Member of UKR Defense	1.77	0.08	1	1.50	0.15	1
IDPs in HH	0.71	0.69	1	0.33	0.95	1
Rural / Urban	1.94	0.05	1	0.86	0.55	1
Interview language	2.17	0.03	1	1.56	0.13	1
Native language	3.23	0.0000	0.001	1.49	0.09	1
Ukrainian ethnic identity	0.65	0.73	1	0.85	0.56	1
Russian ethnic identity	0.47	0.88	1	0.73	0.66	1
Affectedness						
Affectedness score	2.70	0.0003	0.01	2.11	0.01	0.32
East vs. West	1.07	0.38	1	2.93	0.003	0.16
Oblast first attacked	0.63	0.75	1	1.53	0.14	1
Self war-affected	2.02	0.04	1	1.22	0.28	1
Family war-affected	0.67	0.72	1	1.02	0.42	1
Any one-sided violence	1.41	0.18	1	3.09	0.002	0.10
Any battles	1.83	0.07	1	1.10	0.36	1
Any shelling	1.52	0.14	1	0.81	0.59	1
Attitudes						
Importance of victory	0.94	0.48	1	1.27	0.26	1
Interaction w/ neighbours	0.83	0.70	1	0.93	0.56	1
Trust in neighbours	1.23	0.20	1	1.03	0.42	1
Higher standards for Russians	1.05	0.39	1	2.29	0.02	1
Higher standards for Ukrainians	1.40	0.19	1	1.70	0.09	1
More forgiving of Russians	2.95	0.003	0.15	1.32	0.23	1
More forgiving of Ukrainians	1.38	0.20	1	0.88	0.54	1

Note: Adjusted p-values based on a Bonferroni adjustment for 54 hypotheses.

G   Pre-registration

Table A4 summarizes our results and maps the pre-registered hypotheses for Experiments I and II to the hypotheses as presented in the paper and points to where the relevant results are reported.

Table A4: Pre-Analysis Plan, Experiments I & II

Hypothesis in Pre-analysis Plan	Support FC	Support Rating	Paper
H1 causal significance: The more significant an individual's contribution to Ukraine's (Russia's) winning the war, the more (less) likely they are to be preferred/rated highly.	YES (Figure 2)	YES (Figure A4)	H3
H2 voluntariness: The positive (negative) effect of an individual's contribution to Ukraine's (Russia's) winning the war is weaker when the individual is acting reluctantly and stronger when the individual is acting freely.	YES (Figure 3)	YES (Figure A7)	H4
H3 occupation: Individuals who previously lived under Russian occupation are less likely to be preferred/rated highly than those under the control of the Ukrainian government.	YES (Figure 2)	YES (Figure A4)	H2
H3a Russian control and conduct: The positive effect of an individual's contribution to Ukraine's winning the war is stronger for an individual living under Russian rather than Ukrainian control.	NO (Figure A11)	NO (Figure A11)	H7a
H3b Ukrainian control and conduct: The negative effect of an individual's contribution to Russia's winning the war is stronger for an individual living Ukrainian rather than Russian control.	PARTIAL (Figure A11)	YES (Figure A11)	H7b
H4a duty of resistance: An individual who keeps their head down under occupation is preferred/rated higher to an individual who keeps their head down not under occupation.	YES (Figure A11)	YES (Figure A11)	NA
H4b resistance as supererogation: There is no difference between an individual who keeps their head down under occupation and one who keeps their head down not under occupation.	NO (Figure A11)	NO (Figure A11)	NA
H5 ethnic descent: Individuals of Russian ethnic descent are less likely to be preferred/rated highly than individuals of Ukrainian descent.	YES (Figure 2)	YES (Figure A4)	H1
H6a out-group bias: The negative effect of more significant collaboration with Russia is larger for individuals of Russian vs. Ukrainian descent.	NO (Figure A11)	NO (Figure A11)	H5a
H7a out-group bias: The positive effect of more significant resistance to Russia is smaller for individuals of Russian vs. Ukrainian descent.	NO (Figure A11)	NO (Figure A11)	H5b
H6b in-group expectation: The negative effect of more significant collaboration with Russia is larger for individuals of Ukrainian vs. Russian descent.	YES (Figure A11)	YES (Figure A11)	H6a
H7b in-group expectation: The positive effect of more significant resistance to Russia is smaller for individuals of Ukrainian vs. Russian descent.	YES (Figure A11)	YES (Figure A11)	H6b
H8 redemption through apology: An individual that publicly apologized is more likely to be preferred/rated highly.	YES (Figure A20)	YES (Figure A20)	H8
H9 redemption through punishment: The harsher the prison sentence that an individual received the more likely they are to be preferred/rated highly.	NO (Figure A20)	NO (Figure A20)	H9
H10a out-group bias apology: The positive effect of an apology is weaker for individuals of Russian vs. Ukrainian descent.	NO (Figure A25)	NO (Figure A25)	H10a
H10b in-group expectation apology: The positive effect of an apology is weaker for individuals of Ukrainian vs. Russian descent.	NO (Figure A25)	NO (Figure A25)	H10b
H11a out-group bias punishment: The positive effect of a harsher sentence is weaker for individuals of Russian vs. Russian descent.	NO (Figure A23)	NO (Figure A23)	H11a
H11b in-group expectation punishment: The positive effect of a harsher sentence is weaker for individuals of Ukrainian vs. Russian descent.	NO (Figure A23)	NO (Figure A23)	H11b

H   Appendix References

Dill, Janina, Marnie Howlett and Carl Müller-Crepon. 2023. "At Any Cost: How Ukrainians Think about Self-Defense Against Russia." *American Journal of Political Science* .